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Abstract
In a classical optimal stopping problem in continuous time, the agent can choose any
stopping time without constraint. Dupuis and Wang (Optimal stopping with random
intervention times, Advances in Applied Probability, 34, 141–157, 2002) introduced a
constraint on the class of admissible stopping times which was that they had to take
values in the set of event times of an exogenous, time-homogeneous Poisson process. This
can be thought of as a model of finite liquidity. In this article we extend the analysis of
Dupuis and Wang to allow the agent to choose the rate of the Poisson process. Choosing
a higher rate leads to a higher cost. Even for a simple model for the stopped process and
a simple call-style payoff, the problem leads to a rich range of optimal behaviours which
depend on the form of the cost function. Often the agent accepts the first offer — if they
are not going to accept an offer then there is no point in putting in effort to generate
offers, and thus there may be no offers to accept or decline — but for some set-ups this is
not the case.
1 Introduction
Optimal stopping problems are widespread in economics and finance (and other fields) where
they are used to model asset sales, investment times and the exercise of American-style options.
In typical applications an agent observes a stochastic process, possibly representing the price
of an asset, and chooses a stopping time in order to maximise the expected discounted value
of a payoff which is contingent upon the process evaluated at that time.
Implicit in the classical version of the above problem is the idea that the agent can sell the
asset (decide to invest, exercise the option) at any moment of their choosing, and for financial
assets traded on an exchange this is a reasonable assumption. However, for other classes of
assets, including those described as ‘real assets’ by, for example, Dixit and Pindyck [2], this
assumption may be less plausible. Here we are motivated by an interpretation of the optimal
stopping problem above in which an agent has an asset for sale, but can only complete the sale
if they can find a buyer, and candidate buyers are only available at certain isolated instants
of time.
In this work we model the arrival of candidate purchasers as the event times of a Poisson
process. When a candidate purchaser arrives the agent can choose to sell to that purchaser,
or not; if a sale occurs then the problem terminates, otherwise the candidate purchaser is lost,
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and the problem continues. If the Poisson process has a constant rate, then the analysis falls
into the framework studied by Dupuis and Wang [3] and Lempa [5].
Dupuis and Wang [3] and Lempa [5] discuss optimal stopping problems, but closely related
is the work of Rogers and Zane [12] in the context of portfolio optimisation. Rogers and Zane
consider an optimal investment portfolio problem under the hypothesis that the portfolio
can only be rebalanced at event times of a Poisson process of constant rate, see also Pham
and Tankov [10] and Ang, Papanikolaou and Westerfield [1]. The study of optimal stopping
problems when the stopping times are constrained to be event times of an exogenous process
is relatively unexplored, but Guo and Liu [4] study a problem in which the aim is to maximise
a payoff contingent upon the maximum of an exponential Brownian motion and Menaldi
and Robin [8] extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang [3] to consider non-exponential inter-
arrival times. As a generalisation of optimal stopping, Liang and Wei [6] consider an optimal
switching problem when the switching times are constrained to be event times of a Poisson
process.
In this article we consider a more sophisticated model of optimal stopping under constraints
in which the agent may expend effort in order to increase the frequency of the arrival times
of candidate buyers. (Note that the problem remains an optimal stopping problem, since at
each candidate sale opportunity the agent optimises between continuing and selling.) In our
model the agent’s instantaneous effort rate Et affects the instantaneous rate Λt of the Poisson
process, so that the candidate sale opportunities become the event times of an inhomogeneous
Poisson process, where the agent chooses the rate. However, this effort is costly, and the agent
incurs a cost per unit time which depends on the instantaneous effort rate. The objective
of the agent is to maximise the expected discounted payoff net of the expected discounted
costs. In particular, if X = (Xt)t≥0 with X0 = x is the asset price process, g is the payoff
function, β is the discount factor, E = (Et)t≥0 is the chosen effort process, Λ = (Λt)t≥0 given
by Λt = Ψ(Et) is the instantaneous rate of the Poisson process, CE is the cost function so
that the cost incurred per unit time is CE(Et), and TΛ is the set of event times of a Poisson
process, rate Λ, then the objective of the agent is to maximise the objective function
Ex
[
e−βτg(Xτ )−
∫ τ
0
e−βsCE(Es)ds
]
(1)
over admissible effort processes E and TΛ-valued stopping times τ . Our goal is to solve for
the value function, the optimal stopping time and the optimal effort, as represented by the
optimal control process E. In fact, typically it is possible to use the rate of the Poisson process
as the control variable by setting C(Λt) = CE(Et) = CE ◦ Ψ−1(Λt). In the context of the
problem it is natural to assume that Ψ and CE are increasing functions, so that Ψ
−1 exists,
and C is increasing.
Our focus is on the case where X is an exponential Brownian motion, but the general case
of a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion can be reduced to this case at the expense of slightly
more complicated technical conditions. See Lempa [5] for a discussion in the constant arrival
rate case. We begin by rigorously stating the form of the problem we will study. Then we
proceed to solve for the effort process and stopping rule in (1). It turns out that there are two
distinctive cases depending on the shape of C or more precisely on the finiteness or otherwise
of limλ↑∞
C(λ)
λ . Note that it is not clear a priori what shape C = CE ◦ Ψ−1 should take,
beyond the fact that it is increasing. Generally one might expect an increasing marginal cost
of effort and a law of diminishing returns to effort which would correspond to convex CE ,
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concave Ψ and convex C. But a partial reverse is also conceivable: effort expended below
a threshold has little impact, and it is only once effort has reached a critical threshold that
extra effort readily yields further stopping opportunities; in this case Ψ would be convex and
C might be concave.
One outcome of our analysis is that the agent exerts effort to create a positive stopping rate
only if they are in the region where stopping is optimal. Outside this region, they typically
exert no effort, and there are no stopping opportunities. Typically therefore, (although we give
a counterexample in an untypical case) the agent stops at the first occasion where stopping
is possible and the optimal stopping element of the problem is trivial.
2 The set-up
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F = (Ft)t≥0) which satisfies the usual con-
ditions and which supports a Brownian motion and an independent Poisson process. On
this space there is a regular, time-homogeneous diffusion process X = (Xt)t≥0 driven by the
Brownian motion. We will assume that X is exponential Brownian motion with volatility σ
and drift µ and has initial value x; then
dXt = σdWt + µdt, X0 = x.
Here µ and σ are constants with µ < β. The agent has a perpetual option with increaing
payoff g : R+ 7→ R+ of linear growth. In our examples g is an American call: g(x) = (x−K)+.
Then, in the classical setting, the problem of the agent would be to maximise E[e−βτg(Yτ )]
over stopping times τ . Note that the linear growth condition, together with µ < β, is sufficient
to ensure that this classical problem is well-posed.
We want to introduce finite liquidity into this problem, in the sense that we want to
incorporate the phenomena that in order to sell the agent needs to find a buyer, and such
buyers are in limited supply. In the simplest case buyers might arrive at event times of a
time-homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ, and then at each event time of the Poisson
process the agent faces a choice of whether to sell to this buyer at this moment or not; if
yes then the sale occurs and the optimal stopping problem terminates, if no then the buyer
is irreversibly lost, and the optimal stopping problem continues. We want to augment this
problem to allow the agent to expend effort (via networking, research or advertising) in order
to increase the flow of buyers. There is a cost of searching in this way — the higher the effort
the higher the rate of candidate stopping times but also the higher the search costs. Note
that once the asset is sold, effort expended on searching ceases, and search costs thereafter
are zero by fiat.
Let AE be the set of admissible effort processes. We assume that E ∈ AE if E = (Et)t≥0
is an adapted process such that Et ∈ IE for all t ∈ [0,∞) where IE ⊂ R+ is an interval which
is independent of time. Then, since Λt = Ψ(Et) we find E ∈ AE if and only if Λ ∈ A where
Λ ∈ A if Λ is adapted and Λt ∈ I for all t where I = Ψ(IE). Note that I is an interval in R+,
and we take the lower and upper endpoints to be λ and λ respectively.
Recall that TΛ is the set of event times of an inhomogeneous Poisson process with rate Λ.
Then TΛ = {TΛ1 , TΛ2 , . . .} where 0 < TΛ1 and TΛn < TΛn+1 almost surely. Let T (TΛ) be the set
of TΛ-valued stopping times and let A be the set of admissible rate functions. Then, after a
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change of independent variable the problem is to find
H(x) = sup
Λ∈A
sup
τ∈T (TΛ)
Ex
[
e−βτg(Xτ )−
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
, (2)
together with the optimal rate function Λ∗ = (Λ∗t )t≥0 and optimal stopping rule τ∗ ∈ T (TΛ).
In addition to the set of admissible controls, we also consider the subset of integrable
controls I ⊆ A where Λ ∈ I = I(I, C) is an adapted process with Λt ∈ I for which
Ex[
∫∞
0 e
−βsC(Λs)ds] < ∞. As mentioned above we have that Ex
[
e−βτg(Xτ )
]
< ∞ for any
admissible Λ and any stopping rule, and hence there is no loss of generality in restricting the
search for the optimal rate function to the set of integrable controls.
The stopping rule is easily identified in feedback form. Let T 0Λ = TΛ ∪ {0} and let H0 be
the value of the problem conditional on there being a buyer available at time 0, so that
H0(x) = sup
Λ∈A
sup
τ∈T (T 0Λ)
Ex
[
e−βτg(Xτ )−
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
.
Then, it is optimal to stop immediately if and only if the value of stopping is at least as large
as the value of continuing and
H0(x) = max{g(x), H(x)}.
It follows that if Λ = (Λt)t≥0 is a fixed admissible rate process, and if H0Λ and HΛ denote
the respective value functions then, writing T1 = T
Λ
1 for the first event time of the Poisson
process with rate Λ,
HΛ(x) = sup
τ∈T (TΛ)
Ex
[
e−βτg(Xτ )−
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
= sup
τ∈T (TΛ)
Ex
[
e−βT1E
[
e−β(τ−T1)g(Xτ )−
∫ τ
T1
e−β(s−T1)C(Λs)ds
∣∣∣∣FT1]− ∫ T1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
= Ex
[
e−βT1H0Λ(XT1)−
∫ ∞
0
I{s<T1}e
−βsC(Λs)ds
]
= Ex
[∫ ∞
0
Λse
− ∫ s0 Λudue−βsH0Λ(Xs)ds−
∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ s
0 Λudue−βsC(Λs)ds
]
= Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−(βs+
∫ s
0 Λudu)(ΛsH
0
Λ(Xs)ds− C(Λs))ds
]
.
Taking a supremum over admissible rate processes Λ ∈ A we find
H(x) = sup
Λ∈A
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (β+Λs)ds
(
ΛtH
0
Λ(Xt)− C(Λt)
)
dt
]
,
and this is the problem we aim to solve. Writing Λ∗ for the optimal rate process we expect
H to solve
H(x) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−
∫ t
0 (β+Λ
∗
s)ds (Λ∗t {g(Xt) ∨H(Xt)} − C(Λ∗t )) dt
]
.
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2.1 Some results for classical problems
For future reference we record some results for classical problems in which agents can stop at
any instant.
First, let T ([0,∞)) be the set of all stopping times and define
wK(x) := sup
τ∈T ([0,∞))
Ex[e−βτ (Xτ −K)+].
(Imagine a standard, perpetual, American-style call option with strike K, though valuation is
not taking place under the equivalent martingale measure.) Classical arguments (McKean [7],
Peskir and Shiryaev [9]) give that 0 < wK < x (the upper bound holds since we are assuming
β > µ) and that there exists a constant L = θθ−1K where θ =
(
1
2 − µσ2
)
+
√(
1
2 − µσ2
)2
+ 2β
σ2
such that
wK(x) =
{
(x−K)+, x > L;
(L−K)L−θxθ, 0 < x ≤ L.
For future reference set φ =
(
1
2 − µσ2
)−√(12 − µσ2 )2 + 2βσ2 . Then φ < 0 < 1 < θ and θ and φ
are the roots of Q0 = 0 where Qλ(ψ) =
1
2σ
2ψ(ψ − 1) + µψ − (β + λ).
Second, define
wK,,δ(x) = sup
τ∈T ([0,∞))
Ex
[
e−βτ{(Xτ −K)+ − } − δ
∫ τ
0
e−βsds
]
. (3)
(Imagine a perpetual, American-style call option with strike K, in which the agent pays a
fee or transaction cost  to exercise the option, and pays a running cost δ per unit time until
the option is exercised.) Note that wK,0,0 ≡ wK . It turns out that there are two cases. In
the first case when  ≥ δ/β, when X is small it is more cost effective to pay the running cost
indefinitely than to pay the exercise fee. We find
wK,,δ(x) = w
K+−δ/β(x)− δ/β.
In the second case when  < δ/β, when X is small it is cost-effective to stop immediately,
even though the payoff is zero, because paying the fee is cheaper than paying the running cost
indefinitely. In this case we find that w = wK,,δ and a pair of thresholds l
∗ = l∗(K, , δ) and
L∗ = L∗(K, , δ) with 0 < l∗ < K +  < L∗ satisfy the variational problem
{w is C1; w = − on (0, l∗); Lw − βw = δ on (l∗, L∗); w = x−K −  on (L∗,∞) }
Returning to our problem with limited stopping opportunities, one immediate observation
is that H(x) ≤ wK(x). Conversely, if Λ ≡ 0 is admissible then H(x) ≥ −C(0)β .
3 Heuristics
From the Markovian structure of the problem we expect that the (unknown) value function
H and optimal rate function Λ∗ are time-homogeneous functions of the asset price only.
Let MΛ = (MΛt )t≥0 be given by
MΛt = e
− ∫ t0 (β+Λs)dsH(Xt) +
∫ t
0
e−
∫ u
0 (β+Λs)ds
[
ΛuH
0(Xu)− C(Λu)
]
du,
5
and let LX denote the generator of X so that LXf = σ22 f ′′ + µf ′. Assume that the value
function under the optimal strategy H is C2. Then, by Itoˆ’s formula,
dMΛt = e
− ∫ t0 (β+Λs)ds {(LXH(Xt)− (β + Λt)H(Xt) + Λt(H0(Xt)− C(Λt))) dt+ σXtH ′(Xt)dWt} .
We expect that MΛ is a super-martingale for any choice of Λ, and a martingale for the optimal
choice. Thus we expect
LXH(Xt)− βH(Xt)− inf
Λt
{
C(Λt)− Λt[H0(Xt)−H(Xt)]
}
= 0.
Let C˜ : R+ 7→ R be the concave conjugate of C so that C˜(z) = infλ≥0{C(λ)− λz}. Then we
find that H solves
LXH − βH − C˜(H0 −H) = 0, (4)
and a best choice of rate function is Λ∗t = Λ∗(Xt) where
Λ∗(x) = Θ(H0(x)−H(x)) (5)
and Θ(z) = arginfλ{C(λ)−λz}. Note that H0−H = (g−H)+ and that (4) is a second order
differential equation and will have multiple solutions. The boundary behaviour near zero and
infinity will determine which solution fits the optimal stopping problem.
3.1 First Example: Quadratic cost functions
Suppose g(x) = (x −K)+ for fixed K > 0. Using terminology from the study of American
options and optimal stopping we say that if Xt > K then the process is in-the-money, if
Xt < K then the process is out-of-the-money and the region in the domain of X where Λ
∗(X)
is zero is the continuation region C, and S := R+ \ C is the selling region.
Suppose the range of possible values for the rate process is I = [0,∞) and consider a
quadratic cost function C(λ) = a + bλ + cλ
2
2 with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and c > 0. Then C˜(z) =
a− [(z−b)+]22c .
Consider first the behaviour of the value function near zero. If a = 0 then C(0) = 0, and
when X is close to zero the agent may choose not to search for buyers, a strategy which incurs
zero cost. There is little chance of the process ever being in-the-money, but nonethelesss the
agent delays sale indefinitely. We expect that the continuation region is (0, L∗) for some
threshold L∗.
Now suppose a > 0. Now there is a cost to delaying the sale, even when Λ = 0. If X
is small then it is preferable to sell the asset even though the process is out-of-the-money,
because in our problem there are no search costs once the asset is sold. In this case we expect
the agent to search for buyers when X is small, in order to reduce further costs. Then the
continuation region will be (`∗, L∗) for some 0 < `∗ < K < L∗ <∞.
Consider now the behaviour for large x. In this case we can look for an expansion for the
solution of (4) of the form
H(x) = A1x+A1/2
√
x+A0 +O(x
−1/2)
for constants A1, A1/2 and A0 to be determined. Using the fact that H(x) ≤ wK(x) so that
H is of at most linear growth we find
H(x) = x−
√
2c(β − µ)√x−
{
K + b− c
[
β − µ
2
+
σ2
8
]}
+ . . . (6)
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Numerical results (see Figure 1) show that this expansion is very accurate for large x.
3.1.1 Purely quadratic cost: a = 0 = b
In this case we expect that the continuation region is (0, L∗) for a threshold level L∗ to be
determined. For a general threshold L, and writing HL for the solution to (4) with H(0) = 0
and H(L) = L−K we find that HL solves
LXh− βh = 1
2c
({g − h}+)2, (7)
and then that HL(x) =
L−K
Lθ
xθ on x ≤ L. On (L,∞), HL solves (7) subject to HL(L) =
(L −K) and H ′L(L) = θL−KL . This procedure gives us a family (HL)L≥K of potential value
functions, each of which is C1. Finally we can determine the threshold level L we need by
choosing the value L∗ for which HL∗ has linear growth at infinity.
(a) For large x (b) For small x
Figure 1: (β, µ, σ,K, a, b, c) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2). In both sub-figures the solid curved line
represents HL∗ ; the straight line represents g ∨HL∗ on {x : g(x) ≥ HL∗(x)} and the dashed
line in the left sub-figure is the expansion for H in (6). The optimal threshold is seen in the
right sub-figure to be at L∗ = 1.35.
The linear growth solution HL∗ is shown in Figure 1, both for large x and for moderate
x. From Figure 1(b) we see that the continuation region is C = (0, 1.35) and that the stop-
ping region S = [1.35,∞). We also see that the expansion for H given in (6) gives a good
approximation of our numerical solution for large x.
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Figure 2: (β, µ, σ,K, a, b, c) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2); this figure plots the optimal control Λ∗ given
by (5) as a function of wealth level x.
Figure 2 shows the optimal control. We see that Λ∗ is zero on the continuation region
C = (0, L) and that Λ∗ is increasing and concave on the stopping region S = [L,∞). The
agent behaves rationally in the sense that on the continuation region where continuing is
worth more than stopping, the agent is unwilling to stop and this is reflected by the minimal
efforts spent on searching (i.e. Λ∗(x) = 0,∀x ∈ C); similarly, on the stopping region, stopping
is getting more and more valuable relative to continuing as the price process gets deeper
in-the-money, and the agent is incentivised to spend more effort on searching for stopping
opportunities.
We discuss the cases of a > 0 and b > 0 in Section 6.
4 Verification
In this section we show that the heuristics are correct, and that the value to the stochastic
problem is given by the appropriate solution of the differential equation. Although the details
are different, the structure of the proof follows Dupuis and Wang [3].
Suppose, as throughout, that X is exponential Brownian motion with µ < β and g is of
linear growth.
Definition 1. (τ,Λ) is admissible if Λ is a non-negative, I-valued, adapted process and τ ∈
T (TΛ).
Note that a consequence of the definition is that we insist that τ ≤ TΛ∞ := limn TΛn . More-
over, we may have Tk =∞: in this case we may take τ =∞, whence we have e−βτg(Xτ ) = 0
noting that limt↑∞ e−βtg(Xt) = 0 almost surely.
Definition 2. (τ,Λ) is integrable if (τ,Λ) is admissible and E[
∫ τ
0 e
−βsC(Λs)ds] <∞.
Clearly, if (τ,Λ) is integrable, then (TΛ1 ,Λ) is integrable.
Lemma 1. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to
LXG− βG− C˜((g −G)+) = 0, (8)
and suppose that G is of at most linear growth. Set G0 = G ∨ g.
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Then for any integrable, admissible strategy (τ,Λ),
G(x) ≥ Ex
[
e−βT
Λ
1 G0(XTΛ1
)I{TΛ1 <∞} −
∫ TΛ1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
. (9)
Proof. Since g and G are of linear growth we may assume G0(x) ≤ κ0+κ1x for some constants
κi ∈ (0,∞).
Let Zt = e
−βt−∫ t0 ΛsdsG(Xt)− ∫ t0 e−βs−∫ s0 ΛuduFsds where
Fs = F (g(Xs), G(Xs),Λs) := (g(Xs)−G(Xs))+Λs + C˜((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) ≤ C(Λs).
Then, using the definition of G
dZt = e
−βt−∫ t0 Λsds {−(β + Λt)G+ LXG− (g −G)+Λt − C˜((g −G)+)} dt+ dNt
= e−βt−
∫ t
0 Λsds {−Λt[G+ (g −G)+]} dt+ dNt
= −e−βt−
∫ t
0 ΛsdsΛtG
0(Xt)dt+ dNt
where Nt =
∫ t
0 e
−βs−∫ s0 ΛuduσXsG′(Xs)dWs. Our hypotheses on G allow us to conclude that
N = (Nt)t≥0 is a martingale.
It follows that Z0 = E[Zt +
∫ t
0 e
−βs−∫ s0 ΛuduΛsG0(Xs)ds] or equivalently
G(x) = Ex
[
e−βt−
∫ t
0 ΛsdsG(Xt) +
∫ t
0
e−βs−
∫ s
0 Λudu (Λs(g(Xs) ∨G(Xs))− Fs) ds
]
≥ Ex
[
e−βt−
∫ t
0 ΛsdsG(Xt) +
∫ t
0
e−βs−
∫ s
0 Λudu
(
ΛsG
0(Xs)− C(Λs)
)
ds
]
. (10)
Since X is geometric Brownian motion and β > µ we have that Xβ,∗ := supu≥0{e−βuXu} is
in L1. Then
e−βt−
∫ t
0 ΛsdsG(Xt) ≤ κ0 + κ1Xβ,∗,∫ t
0
e−βs−
∫ s
0 ΛuduΛsG
0(Xs)ds ≤ (κ0 + κ1Xβ,∗)
∫ t
0
Λse
− ∫ s0 Λududs ≤ κ0 + κ1Xβ,∗,∫ t
0
e−βs−
∫ s
0 ΛuduC(Λs)ds ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−βs−
∫ s
0 ΛuduC(Λs)ds,
and, since (TΛ1 ,Λ) is integrable by hypothesis,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βs−
∫ s
0 ΛuduC(Λs)ds
]
= E
[∫ TΛ1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
<∞.
Then Dominated Convergence, together with the fact that e−βtXt → 0 gives (9).
Lemma 2. Let (τ,Λ) be an integrable strategy. Define Y = (Yn)n≥0 by
Yn = e
−β(TΛn ∧τ)G0(XTΛn ∧τ )I{TΛn ∧τ<∞} −
∫ TΛn ∧τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
where TΛ0 = 0. Define Gn = FTΛn and set G = (Gn)n≥0.
Then Y is a uniformly integrable (Gn)n≥0-supermartingale.
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Proof. We have
|Yn| ≤ κ0 + κ1Xβ,∗ +
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds ∈ L1.
Moreover, on TΛn−1 < ∞ and τ > TΛn−1, writing T˜ as shorthand for TΛn − TΛn−1 and using
τ ≥ TΛn and Lemma 1 for the crucial first inequality,
E[Yn|Gn−1] = e−βTΛn−1E
[
e−βT˜G0(XTΛn )I{TΛn <∞} −
∫ TΛn
TΛn−1
e−βsC(Λs)ds
∣∣∣∣∣Gn−1
]
−
∫ TΛn−1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
≤ e−βTΛn−1G(XTΛn−1)−
∫ TΛn−1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
≤ e−βTΛn−1G0(XTΛn−1)−
∫ TΛn−1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds = Yn−1.
Proposition 1. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to (8) of at most linear growth. Then
H ≤ G.
Proof. Let (τ,Λ) be any integrable strategy.
From Lemma 1 we have
E[Y1] = E
[
e−βT
Λ
1 G0(XTΛ1
)I{TΛ1 <∞} −
∫ TΛ1
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
≤ G(x).
Moreover, since Y is a uniformly integrable supermartingale,
Ex[Y1] ≥ Ex[Y∞] = E
[
e−βτG0(Xτ )I{τ<∞} −
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
≥ E
[
e−βτg(Xτ )I{τ<∞} −
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
.
Taking a supremum over stopping times and rate processes we conclude thatH(x) ≤ G(x).
Our goal now is to show that H = G. We prove this result, first in the simplest case where
the set of admissible rate processes is unrestricted (i.e. Λt takes values in I = [0,∞) and
the cost function C is lower semi-continuous and convex, with limλ↑∞C(λ)/λ = ∞). Then
we argue that the same result holds true under weaker assumptions. Note that we allow for
{λ ∈ I : C(λ) = ∞} to be non-empty, but our assumption that C is lower semi-continuous
means that if λˇ = inf{λ : C(λ) =∞} then C(λˇ) = limλ↑λˇC(λ).
Theorem 1. Suppose I = [0,∞) and C : I 7→ [0,∞] is increasing, convex and lower semi-
continuous with limλ↑∞C(λ)/λ = ∞. Let G be an increasing, convex solution to (8) of at
most linear growth. Then H = G.
Proof. Let C ′ denote the right-derivative of C and set C ′ =∞ on {λ : C(λ) =∞}. Since C ′
is increasing it has a left-continuous inverse D : R+ 7→ R+. In particular, D(y) = sup{λ ∈
[0,∞) : C ′(λ) < y} with the convention that D(y) = 0 if C ′(λ) ≥ y on (0,∞). We note that
our hypotheses mean that D is well defined and finite on (0,∞) and we set D(0) = 0.
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Let Λˆ = (Λˆs)s≥0 be given by Λˆs = D((g(Xs) − G(Xs))+). We will show that Λˆ is the
optimal rate process.
Note first that there is equality in (10), and therefore in (9), provided Fs = F (g(Xs), G(Xs),Λs) =
(g(Xs)−G(Xs))+Λs + C˜((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) = C(Λs). This is satisfied if Λs = Λˆs.
Let X> = {x : g(x) > G(x)} and let X≤ = {x : g(x) ≤ G(x)}. Then, under the hypothesis
of the theorem, whilst X· ∈ X≤ we have that Λˆ· ≡ 0. Hence (almost surely) XT Λˆ1 ∈ X> and
G0(X
T Λˆ1
) = g(X
T Λˆ1
). Then, taking T = T Λˆ1 we have from (9) that
G(x) = E
[
e−βTG0(XT )I{T<∞} −
∫ T
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
= E
[
e−βT g(XT )I{T<∞} −
∫ T
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
≤ H(x)
and hence, combining with Proposition 1, G = H.
Corollary 1. Λ∗ = (Λ∗s)s≥0 given by Λ∗s = D((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) is an optimal strategy, and
τ∗ = TΛ∗1 is an optimal stopping rule.
Our goal now is to extend Theorem 1 to allow for more general admissibility sets and cost
functions.
Let c be a generic increasing, convex function c : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞]. If c takes the value +∞
on (λˇ,∞) then we assume that c(λˇ) = limλ↑∞ c(λ) = c(λˇ), and set the right-derivative c′
equal to infinity on (λˇ,∞) also. For such a c define Dc : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] by Dc(y) = sup{λ ∈
(0,∞) : c′(y) < y} again with the conventions that Dc(y) = 0 if c′(λ) ≥ y on (0,∞) and
Dc(0) = 0. Note that Dc(y) ≤ sup{y : c(y) <∞}.
Let I with endpoints {λ, λ} be a subinterval of [0,∞) with the property that I is closed on
the left and closed on the right if λ <∞.
Let γ : I 7→ R+ be an increasing function. Let γ˘ be the largest convex minorant of γ on I.
The define γ† by γ†(λ) = γ(λ) on [0, λ) (if this interval is non-empty), γ†(λ) = γ˘(λ) on [λ, λ]
and γ† =∞ on (λ,∞). By construction γ† : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] is convex and we can define Dγ† .
Suppose that C : I 7→ R+ is our increasing, lower semi-continuous cost function. Introduce
C† : R+ 7→ [0,∞] and DC† which we abbreviate to D†. Note that if D†(z) < λ then z = 0,
D†(z) = 0 and C†(0) = C†(λ) = C(λ). Summarising the important results we have:
Lemma 3. C˜ = C˜†. Moreover, for z ∈ [0,∞), C((D†(z) ∨ λ) ∧ λ) = C†(D†(z)).
Theorem 2. Suppose I ⊆ [0,∞) and let C : I 7→ R be increasing, lower semi-continuous and
such that limλ↑∞
C(λ)
λ =∞. Let G be an increasing, convex solution of (8) and suppose G is
of linear growth. Then H = G.
Proof. Introduce C†, defined from C as above, and let H† be the solution of the unrestricted
problem (ie I† = [0,∞)) with (convex) cost function C†. Note that since C˜ = C˜† we have by
Theorem 1 that H† = G. It remains to show that H = H†.
The inequality H ≤ H† is straight-forward: if (τ,Λ) is admissible for the interval I and
integrable for cost function C, then it is admissible for the interval [0,∞) and integrable for
cost function C†; moreover C ≥ C†, and so H ≤ H†.
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For the converse, let Λ† = D†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) and τ † = TΛ†1 be optimal for the problem
with cost function C†. Note that Λ† ≤ λ and that
H†(x) = Ex
[
e−βτ
†
g(Xτ†)−
∫ τ†
0
e−βsC†(Λ†s)ds
]
Define Λ∗ = λ ∨ Λ† and τ∗ = τ †. Then, by Lemma 3,
C(Λ∗s) = C((D
†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+) ∨ λ) ∧ λ) = C†(D†((g(Xs)−G(Xs))+)) = C†(Λ†s).
Moreover, Λ∗ ∈ [λ, λ] and is admissible for the original problem with admissibility interval I.
Then
H†(x) = Ex
[
e−βτ
∗
g(Xτ∗)−
∫ τ∗
0
e−βsC(Λ∗s)ds
]
≤ H(x).
Remark 1. Note that Λ∗ ≥ Λ† and we may have strict inequality if λ > 0. In that case, when
g(Xs) ≤ G(Xs) we have Λ†s = 0, but Λ∗s = λ. In particular, we may have τ∗ > TΛ
∗
1 , and the
agent does not sell at the first opportunity. See Section 6.3.
5 Concave cost functions
In this section we provide a complementary result to Theorem 1 by considering a concave cost
function C (defined on I = [0,∞)).
Suppose C is increasing and concave on [0,∞). Then the greatest convex minorant C˘ of C
is of the form
C˘(λ) = δ + λ
for some constants δ,  ∈ [0,∞). Then, C and C˘ have the same concave conjugates given by
C˜(z) := infλ>0{C(λ)− λz} where C˜(z) = δ for z ≤  and C˜(z) = −∞ for z > .
From the heuristics section we expect the value function to solve (4). Then we might expect
that on g −H <  we have
LXH − βH − δ = 0. (11)
On the other hand some care is needed to interpret LXH − βH = C˜((g − H)+) on the set
g−H > . In fact, as we argue in the following theorem, H ≥ g−  and on the set H = g− 
(11) needs to be modified. We show that H = wK,,δ where (recall (3))
wK,,δ(x) = sup
τ∈T ([0,∞))
Ex
[
e−βτ{(Xτ −K)+ − } − δ
∫ τ
0
e−βsds
]
. (12)
The intuition is that when H > g −  it is optimal to wait and to take Λ = 0 at cost δ per
unit time. However, on H < g −  (and also when H = g − ) it is optimal to take Λ as
large as possible. Since there is no upper bound on Λ, this corresponds to taking Λ infinite
— such a choice is inadmissible but can be approximated with ever larger finite values. Then,
in the region where the agent wants to stop, if the stopping rate is large, say N , then the
expected time to stop is N−1, the cost incurred per unit time is C(N) ≈ δ + N , and so the
expected total cost of stopping is approximately δ+NN ≈ . Effectively the agent can choose
to sell (almost) instantaneously, for a fee or fixed transaction cost of . This explains why the
problem value is the same as the problem value for (12).
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Theorem 3. Let I = [0,∞) and let C : I 7→ R+ be non-negative, increasing and concave.
Suppose the greatest convex minorant C˘ of C(λ) is of the form C˘(λ) = δ+λ for non-negative
constants δ and .
Then H(x) = wK,,δ(x).
Proof. First we show that for any integrable τ and Λ
Ex
[
e−βτ (Xτ −K)+ −
∫ τ
0
e−βsC(Λs)ds
]
≤ wK,,δ(x).
Then we show that there is a sequence of admissible strategies for which the value function
converges to this upper bound.
We prove the result in the case  ≥ δ/β when the cost of taking Λ = 0 is small relative to
the proportional cost C(λ)/λ associated with taking Λ large. The proof in the case  < δ/β is
similar, but slightly more complicated in certain verification steps, because the explicit form
of wK,,δ is not so tractable.
When  ≥ δ/β we have that w = wK,,δ is given by
w(x) =
{
Axθ − δβ x ≤ L
(x−K − ) x > L ,
where L = β(K+)−δβ
θ
θ−1 and A =
1
θL
1−θ. Let w0(x) = w(x) ∨ (x − K)+. Note that since
β
µ > θ we have
θ
θ−1 >
β
β−µ and L >
β(K+)−δ
β−µ .
For fixed Λ defineMΛ = (MΛt )t≥0 byMΛt = e−
∫ t
0 (β+Λs)dsw(Xt)+
∫ t
0 e
− ∫ s0 (β+Λu)du[Λsw0(Xs)−
C(Λs)]ds and set Nt =
∫ t
0 e
− ∫ s0 (β+Λu)duσXsw′(Xs)dWs. Then N = (Nt)t≥0 is a martingale
and
dMΛt = dNt + e
− ∫ t0 (β+Λs)ds [LXw − (β + Λt)w + Λtw0 − C(Λt)] dt. (13)
On (0, L), LXw − βw = δ, and (13) becomes
dMΛt = dNt+e
− ∫ t0 (β+Λs)ds[δ−Λtw+Λtw0−C(Λt)]dt ≤ dNt+e− ∫ t0 (β+Λs)ds[Λt(w0−w−)]dt ≤ dNt.
since w0 ≤ w + . Similarly, on (L,∞), w(x) = (x−K)−  and since L > K + , (13) yields
dMΛt ≤ dNt + e−
∫ t
0 (β+Λs)ds[µXt − (β + Λ)(Xt −K − ) + Λt(Xt −K)− (δ + Λt)]dt
= dNt + e
− ∫ t0 (β+Λs)ds[(µ− β)(Xt − L) + (µ− β)L+ β(K + )− δ]dt ≤ dNt.
Putting the two cases together we see that MΛ is a supermartingale for any strategy Λ.
The rest of the proof that H ≤ w follows exactly as in the the proofs of Lemma 1, Lemma 2
and Proposition 1, with w replacing G.
Now we show that there is a sequence of strategies for which the value function converges
to w = wK,,δ. Since δ + λ is the largest convex minorant of C there exists (λn)n≥1 with
λn ↑ ∞ such that C(λn)λn → .
13
Consider first the strategy of a constant rate of search λn, with stopping at the first event
time of the associated Poisson process. Let H˜n denote the associated value function. Then
H˜n(x) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
λne
−λntdt
{
e−βt(Xt −K)+ −
∫ t
0
e−βsC(λn)ds
}]
≥
∫ ∞
0
λne
−λntdt
{
e−βt(xeµt −K)−
∫ t
0
e−βsC(λn)ds
}
=
∫ ∞
0
λne
−(λn+β)t(xeµt −K)dt−
∫ ∞
0
e−βsC(λn)ds
∫ ∞
s
λne
−λntdt
=
λn
λn + β − µx−
λn
λn + β
K − 1
λn + β
C(λn)
and H˜n(x) → x − K −  as n ↑ ∞. Suppose  ≥ δ/β. Let L = β(K+)−δβ θθ−1 and let
τL = inf{u : Xu ≥ L}. Consider the strategy with rate Λˆn = λnI{t≥τL}, for which selling
occurs at the first event time of the Poisson process with this rate, and let Hˆn be the value
function associated with this strategy.
For x ≥ L we have Hˆn(x) = H˜n(x)→ x−K −  = wK,,δ(x).
For x < L, we have Ex[e−βτL ] = ( xL)
θ and
Hˆn(x) = Ex
[
e−βτLH˜n(L)−
∫ τL
0
e−βsC(0)ds
]
= Ex
[
e−βτL
(
H˜n(L) +
C(0)
β
)
− C(0)
β
]
=
(x
L
)θ [
H˜n(L) +
δ
β
]
− δ
β
→ wK,,β(x),
where the last line follows from the definition of L and some algebra.
5.1 An example
In this example we consider a cost function of the form C(λ) =
√
λ. Then a (plausibly) good
strategy is to take Λt = 0 if Xt < L
∗ = θθ−1 and Λt very large otherwise. It is immediate that
the value function H satisfies H ≤ w; conversely, it is clear from Figure 3 that there exist
strategies for which the value function is arbitrarily close to w.
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Figure 3: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 3, 1); the highest line is w = wK,0,0, and the other lines are the
value functions under the rate function Λn(x) = nI{x≥L∗}.
6 Further Examples
6.1 Addition of a linear cost
Let C0 be a convex, lower semi-continuous, increasing cost function, and consider the impact
of adding a linear cost to C0; in particular, let Cb : R+ 7→ R+ be given by Cb(λ) = C0(λ) +λb
for b > 0.
Then the concave conjugates are such that C˜b(z) = C˜0((z − b)+).
Suppose further that G, the solution of (8) of linear growth, is such that G ≥ 0 on R+.
The problem solution in the case of a purely quadratic cost function (recall Section 3.1.1) has
this property. Then
({(x−K)+ −G}+ − b)+ = {(x− (K + b))+ −G}+.
It follows that
C˜b({(x−K)+ −G}+) = C˜0(({(x−K)+ −G}+ − b)+) = C˜0({(x− (K + b))+ −G}+)
and then that the value function for a payoff (x −K)+ with cost function Cb is identical to
the value function for a cost function C0(x) but with modified payoff (x− (K + b))+.
Note that we see a similar result in the expansion (6) for G in the large x regime.
6.2 Quadratic costs with positive fixed cost
In this section we seek to generalise the results of Section 3.1.1 on purely quadratic cost
functions to other quadratic cost functions. In view of the results in Section 6.1 the focus is
on adding a positive intercept term, rather than a linear cost. Indeed the focus is on cost
functions of the form C(λ) = a+ c2λ
2 for a > 0.
In this section we will take a and c fixed and compare the cost fucntions C0(λ) =
c
2λ
2,
C1(λ) = a +
c
2λ
2 and C>(λ) = aI{λ>0} + c2λ
2. The difference between the last two cases is
that in the final case, not searching at all incurs zero cost, whereas in the middle case, there
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is a fixed cost which applies irrespective of whether there is a positive rate of searching for
offers or not.
In Section 3.1.1 we saw that H0, the value function for the cost C0(λ) =
c
2λ
2, solves
LXH0 − βH0 = [(g −H0)+]
2
2c
.
There is a threshold L with L > K, such that H0 > g on (0, L) and H0 < g on (L,∞).
On (0, L) we have that H0(x) = (L − K) xθLθ ; on [L,∞), H0 solves 12σ2x2h′′ + µxh′ − βh =
1
2c(x−K −h)2 subject to initial conditions H0(L) = (L−K) and H ′0(L) = θL−KL . We adjust
L until we find a solution for which H0 is of linear growth at infinity.
Now consider C1 with asscoiated value function H1. When X is very small, there is little
prospect of X ever rising above K. Nonetheless the agent faces a fixed cost, even if she does
not search for offers. It will be cheaper to search for offers, because although the payoff is
zero when a candidate purchaser is found, it is then possible in our model to stop paying the
fixed cost.
Suppose X = 0. If the agent chooses to search for buyers at rate λ then the expected time
until a buyer is found is λ−1. The expected discounted cost until a buyer is found is∫ ∞
0
λe−λs
∫ s
0
e−βu
(
a+
c
2
λ2
)
du =
a+ c2λ
2
β + λ
.
This is minimised by the choice λ = λ∗ where λ∗ =
√
β2 + 2ac − β and the minimal cost is h−∗
where
h−∗ =
a+ c2λ
2∗
β + λ∗
= cλ∗ = c
[√
β2 +
2a
c
− β
]
.
Then H1(0) = −h−∗ . (Another way to see this is to note that at 0 we expect LXH1 = 0 and
therefore H1(0) to solve −βh = C˜(−h) = a − h22c .) Then, the value function H1 is such that
there exists ` and L with 0 < ` < K < L < ∞ such that H1 is C1 with H1 < 0 on (0, `),
H1(x) > (x−K)+ on (`, L) and H1(x) < (x−K)+ on (L,∞) and such that H1 satisfies
LXh− βh =

a− 12ch2 x < `;
a ` < x < L;
a− 12c(g − h)2 L < x.
See Figure 4. Considering H1 on (`, L) we have H1(x) = Ax
θ + Bxφ − aβ for some constants
A and B chosen so that H1(`) = 0 and H1(L) = (L−K):
A =
L−φ(L−K + aβ )− `−φ aβ
Lθ−φ − `θ−φ , B =
`−φLθ−φ aβ − `θ−φL−φ(L−K + aβ )
Lθ−φ − `θ−φ .
Then for general ` and L we can use value matching and smooth fit at ` and L to construct a
solution on (0,∞). Finally, we adjust ` and L until H1(0) = −h−∗ and H1 has linear growth.
In Figure 4 we plot the value function and optimal rate for the Poisson process for C1(λ) =
1+λ2. There are two critical thresholds `∗ and L∗ with 0 < `∗ < K < L∗. Above L∗ the agent
would like to stop in order to receive the payoff (x−K), and is willing to expend effort to try
to generate selling opportunities in order to receive the payoff before discounting reduces the
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(a) The value function H1(x). (b) The optimal rate Λ
∗
1(x).
Figure 4: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost function is C1(λ) = 1 + λ
2. The left figure shows
the value function, and the right figure the optimal stopping rate. There are two critical
thresholds ` = `∗ and L = L∗.
worth. Below `∗ the agent would like to stop, even though the payoff is zero, and is willing to
expend effort to generate stopping opportunities in order to limit the costs they incur prior
to stopping. Between `∗ and L∗ the agent does not expend any effort searching for offers and
would not accept any offers which were received.
Now consider the cost function C>(λ) = aI{λ>0} + c2λ
2 with associated value function
H>. We have C˜>(z) = 0 for z ≤
√
2ac and C˜> = a − z22c for z ≥
√
2ac. As in the pure
quadratic case, there is always the option of taking Λ ≡ 0 at zero cost, so that the value
function is non-negative. It follows that H>(0) = 0. There is a threshold L below which
the agent does not search for offers. But, this threshold is not the boundary between the
sets {x : H>(x) > g(x)} and {x : H>(x) < g(x)}, since when g(x) − H>(x) is small, it is
still preferable to take Λ = 0, rather than to incur the cost of strictly positive λ. Instead L
separates the sets {x : H>(x) > g(x)−
√
2ac} and {x : H>(x) < g(x)−
√
2ac}. We find that
there is a threshold L with L > K such that on (0, L), H> solves LXh − βh = a. At L we
have H>(L) = (L−K −
√
2ac) and it follows that on (0, L) we have H>(x) =
L−K−√2ac
Lθ
xθ.
Then, on (L,∞), H> solves LXh−βh = a− (x−K−h)
2
2c , subject to value matching and smooth
fit conditions at x = L. Finally, we adjust the value of the threshold L until H is of linear
growth for large x.
In Figure 5 we plot the value function H> and optimal rate Λ
∗
>. We see that Λ
∗
> never
takes values in (0, 1) where C> > C˘>. Either it is optimal to spend a non-negligible amount
of effort on searching for candidate buyers, or it is optimal to spend no effort.
Figure 6 compares the value functions and optimal rates for the Poisson process for the three
cost functions C0(λ) = λ
2, C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ2 and C1(λ) = 1 + λ2. Since C0 ≤ C> ≤ C1
we must have that H0 ≥ H> ≥ H1 and we see that away from x = 0 this inequality is
strict. Indeed, especially for small x, H0 and H> are close in value. The differences in
optimal strategies are more marked. For large x the fact that H0 > H> > H1 means that
Λ∗0 < Λ∗> < Λ∗1, and thus that even though C1 > C0, the agent searches at a higher rate under
C1 than under C0. Note that, we only have Λ
∗
> > 0 for x above a critical value (in our case,
approximately 5). Conversely, for C1 there is a second region where Λ1 > 0, namely where x
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(a) The value function H>(x) (b) The optimal rate Λ
∗
>(x)
Figure 5: (β, µ, σ,K) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost function is C>(λ) = I{λ>0} + λ2. The highest
convex minorant is C˘>(λ) = λ+ [(λ− 1)+]2. (Here we use the fact that
√
2ac = 2.)
(a) Comparison of the value functions (b) Comparison of the optimal stopping rates
Figure 6: (β, µ, σ) = (5, 3, 2, 1). The cost functions we consider are C0(λ) = λ
2, C>(λ) =
I{λ>0} + λ2 and C1(λ) = 1 + λ2. The left figure plots the value functions under optimal
behaviour, and the right figure plots the optimal rates for the Poisson process. For x > 5 we
have Λ∗1 > Λ∗> > Λ∗0. For small x, Λ∗1 > 0 = Λ∗> = Λ0.
is small.
6.3 Cost functions defined on a subset of R+
In this section we consider the case where there is a strictly positive lower bound on the rate
at which offers are received. In fact, in our example the optimal rate of offers takes values in
a two-point set. Nonetheless, we see a rich range of behaviours.
Suppose Λ takes values in [λ, λ] where 0 < λ < λ < ∞ and suppose C : [λ, λ] 7→ R+ is
increasing and concave. Introduce C˘ : [λ, λ] 7→ [0,∞) defined by C˘(λ) = C(λ) + λ−λ
λ−λ(C(λ)−
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C(λ)). Finally introduce C† : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞] by
C†(λ) =

C(λ) λ < λ,
C˘(λ) λ ≤ λ ≤ λ,
∞ λ < λ.
Write a = C(λ) and b = (C(λ)−C(λ))
λ−λ . Then C
† has concave conjugate C˜†(z) = a−λz for z ≤ b
and C˜†(z) = a− bλ− (z − b)λ for z > b.
Suppose first that C(λ) = a = 0. Then the value function H is positive, increasing and C1
and satisfies
LXh− βh =

0 x < L,
−λ(g − h) L ≤ x ≤M,
−bλ− λ(g − h− b) M < x,
where L and M are constants satisfying 0 < K < L < M which must be found as part of the
solution, and are such that h(x) > (x−K) on (0, L), (x−K) > h(x) > x−K − b on (L,M)
and (x−K − b) > h(x) on (M,∞). See Figure 7.
Fix L and consider constructing a solution to the above problem with H(0) bounded. On
(0, L) we have that H(x) = Axθ + Bxφ and the requirement that H is bounded means that
B = 0 and then A = (L − K)L−θ. We then use the C1 continuity of H at L to find the
constants C and D in the expression for H over (L,M):
H(x) = Cxθ +Dxφ +
λ
λ+ β − µx−
Kλ
λ+ β
. (14)
Here φ, θ with φ < 0 < 1 < θ are solutions to Qλ(·) = 0 where Qλ(ψ) = 12σ2ψ(ψ − 1) + µψ −
(β + λ). In turn, we can find the value of M = M(L) where H given by (14) crosses the line
y(x) = x −K − b, and then value matching at M gives us the value of E in the expression
for H over [M,∞):
H(x) = Exφ +
λ
λ+ β − µx−
(K + b)λ− bλ
λ+ β
where φ is the negative root of Qλ(·) = 0. (There is no term of the form xθ since H must be
of linear growth at infinity.) Finally, we can solve for L by matching derivatives of H at M .
Figure 7 plots the value function and the optimal rate function. The state space splits into
three regions. On x > M the asset is considerably in-the-money and the agent is prepared to
pay the cost to generate a higher rate of selling opportunities. When x is not quite so large,
and L < x < M , the agent is not prepared to pay this extra cost, but will sell if opportunities
arise. However, if x < L then selling opportunities will arise (we must have Λ ≥ λ) but the
agent will forgo them. Ideally the agent would choose Λ = 0, but this is not possible. Instead
the agent takes Λ = λ, but synthesises a rate of zero, by rejecting all offers.
When C(λ) > 0, the agent will not pay the fixed cost indefinitely when X is small. The
behaviour for large X is unchanged, but the agent will now stop if offers arrive when the value
of continuing is negative, including when X is near zero. There are two cases depending on
whether C(λ)λ+β ≤ C(λ)λ+β or otherwise. In the former case, when X is small it is cheaper to pay
the lower cost and to stop if opportunities arise, than to pay the higher cost with the hope of
stopping sooner. In the latter case, the comparison is reversed. We find that H solves
LXh− βh = C˜((g − h)+)
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(a) The value function H. (b) The optimal rate Λ∗.
Figure 7: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ, C(λ), C(λ)) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10, 0, 20). Note that b = (C(λ)−C(λ))
λ−λ = 4.
The left figure plots the value function and the right figure plots the optimal rate function. Λ
is constrained to lie in [5, 10], and the cost function is 20I{λ>5}. We see that Λ∗ takes values
in {5, 10}.
subject to h(0) = −minλ∈{λ,λ}{C(λ)λ+β } and the fact that h is of linear growth at infinity. The
solution is smooth, except at points where C˜((g − h)+) is not differentiable. This may be at
K where g is not differentiable, or when g = h, or, since C˜ is non-differentiable at b, when
g − h = b.
Figure 8 shows the value function and the optimal search rate in the case where C(λ)λ+β ≤ C(λ)λ+β .
This means that when x is small the agent expends as little effort as possible searching for
offers, although they do accept any offers which arrive. There is also a critical threshold M ,
beyond which it is optimal to put maximum effort into searching for offers. There are then
two sub-cases depending on whether costs are small or large. If costs are large then the agent
will always accept any offer which comes along (Figure 8(c) and (d)). However, when costs
are small (Figure 8(a) and (b)), there is a region (`, L) over which h(x) > g(x) = (x −K)+.
Then, as in the region (0, L) when C(λ) = 0, even when there is an offer the agent chooses
to reject it. Effectively, the agent creates a zero rate of offers by thinning out all the events
of the Poisson process.
Figure 9 shows the value function and the optimal search rate in the case where C(λ)λ+β >
C(λ)
λ+β
.
Then, necessarily, b = C(λ)−C(λ)
λ−λ <
C(λ)
λ+β
. When x is small the agent searches at the maximum
rate to generate an offer as quickly as possible. Necessarily H(0) < −b. If costs are large
enough, then H(x) < (x − k)+ − b for all x, see Figure 9(a) and (b). Then the agent wants
to stop as soon as possible, and is prepared to pay the higher cost rate in order to facilitate
this. As costs decrease, we may have (x − k)+ − b ≤ H(x) for some x, whilst the inequality
H(x) < (x − k)+ remains true, see Figure 9(c) and (d). Then there is a region (m,M) over
which the optimal strategy is Λ∗(x) = λ. The agent still accepts any offer which is made.
Finally, if costs are small enough we find that there is a neighbourhood (`, L) of K for which
H(x) > (x−K)+. Then, on (`, L) the agent takes Λ∗(x) = λ, but chooses to continue rather
than stop if any offers are made.
As a limiting special case suppose λ = λ = λˆ and that C(λˆ) = c ∈ [0,∞). Then there is a
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(a) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
1, C(λ) = 20).
(b) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
1, C(λ) = 20).
(c) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
10, C(λ) = 20).
(d) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
10, C(λ) = 20).
Figure 8: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10). The left panels plot the value function and the
right panels plot the optimal rate function. In each row C(λ)λ+β <
C(λ)
λ+β . In the case of lower
costs (C(λ) = 1) there is a region (`, L) where H(x) > g(x) and the agent chooses to continue
rather than to stop.
single threshold L to be determined and H is of the form
H(x) =
{
Axθ − cβ x ≤ L
Bxφˆ + λˆ
λˆ+β−µx−
(c+λˆK)
β+λˆ
x > L
where φˆ is the negative root of Qλˆ(·) = 0. The value matching condition H(L) = (L − K)
gives that A = L−θ(L−K + cβ ) and
B = L−φˆ
{(
β − µ
λˆ+ β − µ
)
L+
c− βK
β + λˆ
}
.
Then first order smooth fit at L implies that
L = (βK − c)
[
θ
β
− φˆ
β + λˆ
]{
θ − φˆ(β − µ)
λˆ+ β − µ −
λˆ
λˆ+ β − µ
}−1
.
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(a) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
15, C(λ) = 20). b = 1.
(b) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
15, C(λ) = 20).
(c) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
5, C(λ) = 7). b = 0.4.
(d) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
5, C(λ) = 7).
(e) The value function H in the case (C(λ) =
2, C(λ) = 2.5). b = 0.1.
(f) The optimal rate Λ∗ in the case (C(λ) =
2, C(λ) = 2.5).
Figure 9: (β, µ, σ,K, λ, λ) = (5, 3, 2, 1, 5, 10). The left column plots the value function and
the right column plots the optimal rate function. In each row C(λ)λ+β >
C(λ)
λ+β . Near x = 0 it is
always preferable to choose the maximum possible rate process. Costs decrease as we move
down the rows.
Note that if we take c = 0 we recover exactly the expressions in (3.12) and (3.13) of Dupuis
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and Wang [3].
7 Conclusion and discussion
Our goal in this article is to extend the analysis of Dupuis and Wang [3] who considered
optimal stopping problems where the stopping time was constrained to lie in the event times
of a Poisson process, to allow the agent to affect the frequency of those event times. The
motivation was to model a form of illiquidity in trading and to consider problems in which
the agent can exert effort in order to increase the opportunity set of candidate moments
when the problem can terminate. This notion of effort is different to the idea in the financial
economics literature of managers expending effort in order to change the dynamics of the
underlying process, as exemplified by Sannikov [11], but seems appropriate for the context.
Our work focuses on optimal stopping of an exponential Brownian motion under a perpetual
call-style payoff, although it is clear given the work of Lempa [5] how the analysis could be
extended to other diffusion processes and other payoff functions. Nonetheless, even in this
specific case we show how it is possible to generate a rich range of possible behaviours,
depending on the choice of cost function. In our time-homogeneous, Markovian set-up, the
rate of the Poisson process can be considered as a proxy for effort, and the problem can be
cast in terms of this control variable. Then, the form of the solution depends crucially on the
shape of the cost function, as a function of the rate of the inhomogeneous Poisson process.
One important quantity is the limiting value for large λ of the average cost C(λ)λ . If this
limit is infinite, then the agent does not want to select very large rates for the Poisson process
as they are too expensive. In this case we can replace C with its convex minorant and solve
the problem for that cost function. However, if C is concave and the set of possible values for
the rate process is unbounded then when the asset is sufficiently in the money, the agent wants
to choose an infinite rate function, and thus to generate a stopping opportunity immediately.
Choosing a very large rate function, albeit for a short time, incurs a cost equivalent to a fixed
fee for stopping, and this is reflected in the form of the value function.
Another important quantity is the value of C at zero. If a choice of zero stopping rate
is feasible and incurs zero cost per unit time, then the agent always has a feasible, costless
choice for the rate function, and the value function is non-negative. Then, when the asset
price is close to zero we expect the agent to put no effort into searching for buyers, and to
wait. However, if the cost of choosing a zero rate for the Poisson process is strictly positive,
then the agent has an incentive to search for offers even when the asset price is small and the
payoff is zero. When the agent receives an offer they accept, because this ends their obligation
to pay costs. In this way we can have a range of optimal behaviours when the asset price is
small.
When the range of possible rate processes includes zero and C is strictly increasing, then the
agent only exerts effort to generate selling opportunities in circumstances where they would
accept those opportunities. The result is that the agent stops at the first event of the Poisson
process, and the optimal stopping element of the problem is trivial. However, an interesting
feature arises when there is a lower bound on the admissible rate process. Then, the agent
may receive unwanted offers, which they choose to decline. In this case the agent chooses
whether to accept the first offer or to continue.
We model the cost function C as increasing, which seems a natural requirement of the
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problem. (However, if C is not increasing, we can introduce a largest increasing cost function
which lies below C, and the value function for that problem will match the solution of the
original problem.) We also assume that the interval of possible values for the rate process
is closed (at any finite endpoints) and that C is lower semi-continuous. Neither of these as-
sumptions is essential although they do simplify the analysis. In particular, these assumptions
ensure that the minimal cost is attained, and that we do not need to consider a sequence of
approximating strategies and problems.
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